Throughout modern society, human users interact with large-scale engineered systems, e.g., road-traffic networks, electric power grids, wireless communication networks. As the performance of such systems greatly depends on the decisions made by the individual users -often leading to undesirable system behaviour -a natural question arises: How can we design incentives to promote efficient use of the existing infrastructure? Here, we answer this question in relation to the well-studied class of congestion games, used to model a variety of problems arising in theory and practice including traffic routing. In this context, a methodology for designing efficient mechanisms is so far missing, in spite of the vast scientific interest. In this manuscript, we resolve this problem by means of an elegant and computationally tractable approach, recovering and generalizing many results in the literature. Surprisingly, optimal mechanisms designed using local information perform closely to those designed using global information. Additionally, we show how mechanisms that perform optimally in the continuous-flow approximation (marginal cost tolls), worsen the performance when applied to the original discrete setup.
A common issue arising in these settings is the performance degradation incurred when the users' individual objectives are not aligned to the "greater good". Within the environmental sciences this phenomenon has been extensively studied, and, in its extreme form, is referred to as the "tragedy of the commons" (11) . A prime example of how users' behaviour degrades the performance of an engineered system is provided by road-users behaviour infrastructure mechanism performance information incentive sociotechnical system Fig. 1 . Architectural overview on the design of behaviour-influencing mechanism for sociotechnical systems. At the top, sociotechnical systems are captured by the interaction of two blocks representing the users behaviour and the underlying technological infrastructure. A behaviour-influencing mechanism measures the current performance and leverages any additional information so as to improve the resulting performance, by affecting the users' behaviour. A concrete example studied in this manuscript is that of congestion-pricing: the infrastructure is represented by a roadtraffic network, the users behaviour is captured by the notion of Nash equilibrium, the performance is measured by the congestion level, while the mechanism consists in the use of congestion-pricing tolls. Additional information available to the mechanism might include knowledge on the topology of the road-network, users demand, etc.
traffic routing: when drivers choose routes that minimize their individual travel time, the aggregate congestion could be much higher compared to that of a centrally-imposed routing policy. A fruitful paradigm to tackle this issue is to influence users' behaviour through appropriately designed incentives, as widely acknowledged in the economic and computer science literature (12) (13) (14) . Leveraging this approach in the context of sociotechnical systems ( Fig. 1) gives rise to two fundamental questions:
How can we design behaviour-influencing mechanisms to incentivize efficient use of the existing infrastructure?
How does the performance of a behaviour-influencing mechanism depend on the available information?
In this paper we answer these questions in relation to a well-studied class of problems known as congestion games, most notably utilized to model problems in which drivers need to be routed through a congestion-sensitive network (15) . Congestion games were introduced by Rosenthal in 1973 (16) , and since then have found applications in diverse fields such as animal dispersal (17) , energy markets (18) , machine scheduling (19) , wireless data networks (20) , sensor allocation (21) , network design (22) , and many more. While our results can be applied to a variety of problems, in this paper we consider routing problems as our application of interest. Therefore, we introduce congestion games in this context purely for clarity of exposition. minimizes the sum of the users travel times (i.e., it is socially optimal), achieving a system cost of 3. Hence, we say that the equilibrium configuration on the left has efficiency of 4/3 ≈ 1.33.
In a congestion game, we are given a set of edges E representing the road-network, and a set of users N = {1, . . . , n} wishing to travel on the network (see Fig. 2 for a simplified example). To reach her destination, each user i ∈ N can choose between different subsets of E. We list all the options of user i ∈ N in the set Ai ⊆ 2 E . The time required to transit through edge e ∈ E depends only on the number of users traveling through that edge, and is captured by the latency function e : N → R ≥0 . The function e takes into consideration geometric properties such as the length, number of lanes and speed limit of edge e (1) . Once all users have chosen their route ai ∈ Ai, each user experiences a travel time equal to the sum of the latencies over the edges she selected. Finally, the system cost describes the time spent on the network by all users, i.e., SC(a) = e∈E |a|e e(|a|e), [1] where |a|e is the number of users selecting edge e in allocation a = (a1, . . . , an). Since the overall congestion can be much higher when drivers act selfishly (23) , there has been considerable interest in the use of road tolls as a behaviour-influencing mechanisms (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) . Towards this goal, each edge e is associated to a congestion-dependent tolling function τe : N → R ≥0 . As a result, user i ∈ N incurs a cost factoring both the travel time, as well as the tolls levied along her route, i.e., Ci(a) = e∈a i e(|a|e) + τe(|a|e).
The performance of a given set of tolls is typically measured by the ratio between the system cost resulting from the worstperforming emergent behaviour and the minimum system cost. Such a performance metric is referred to as the price-of-anarchy. As users are assumed to be self-interested, the emergent behaviour is well captured by the notion of Nash equilibrium, i.e., a configuration where no single user can reduce her travel time by modifying only her route choice. The transportation and computer science communities have long been asking questions of the form: "How do we design tolls that optimize the system efficiency?" (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) . Fig. 3 illustrates the advantages and challenges associated with the use of behaviour-influencing tolls.
Designing tolls that utilize all the data defining a routing problem is not possible, as that requires the central planner to access private information such as the origin/destination of all users, in addition to the associated computational burden. Therefore, a large portion of the literature has focused on designing tolls that exploit only local information (local tolls), i.e., for which the toll on edge e is constructed only using information on that edge. Since the central planner does not have perfect knowledge about the specific routing instance at hand (e.g., the demand could shift, or the latency functions could be mischaracterized), the tolls need to be designed robustly: while a set of tolls could perform particularly well on one instance, they might be harmful on another one, see Fig. 3 . In light of these challenges, and despite the vast scientific interest, a methodology for designing local tolls that robustly optimize the efficiency is so far missing (see the next section for further details). In this article we show how to resolve this question by means of an elegant and computationally tractable approach.
Our Main Contributions.
-In this manuscript we resolve the problem of designing local tolls that yield the best achievable price-of-anarchy through a tractable linear program.
-Surprisingly, optimal tolls designed using local information perform closely to optimal tolls designed using global information (≤ 1% difference for affine latency functions).
-The efficiency of optimal congestion-dependent and fixed tolls is comparable for polynomial latencies of low degree.
-The efficiency of marginal cost tolls, known to be optimal in the continuous-flow approximation model, is unexpectedly lower than that encountered levying no toll, when applied to the original discrete setup. Review of Tolling in Congestion Games. The scientific interest in the design of tolls dates back to the early 1900s (23) . Since then, a large body of literature in the areas of transportation and computer science has investigated this approach (24) (25) (26) (27) .
Un-tolled Tolled
Designing tolling mechanisms that optimize the efficiency is particularly challenging in the context of congestion games, as observed, e.g., by (31) , in part due to the multiplicity of the equilibria. While most of the research (32) (33) (34) (35) has focused on providing efficiency bounds for given schemes (or in the un-tolled case), little is known regarding the design question, except that no tolling scheme can incentivize optimal routing in every instance (30) . While tolling schemes utilizing global information have recently been proposed for the case of polynomial latency functions (29) , they require complete network and user information -an often impractical scenario. As a result, the proposed tolls lack the desired robustness property (see Fig. 3 ).
Despite the vast scientific interest, there is so far no means to derive a set of optimal local tolls, let alone a computationally tractable approach to do so. The only available answer is confined to problems where all latencies are affine functions, and under the restrictive requirement that each toll is congestion-independent (28) . Our work resolves this problem and shows how to derive local tolls that maximize the system efficiency through the solution of a tractable linear program.
The continuous-flow approximation of the congestion game model is better understood, as uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is guaranteed, greatly simplifying the analysis. In this setting, marginal cost tolls produce an emergent behaviour which is always optimal (23, 36) . Here, we demonstrate that utilizing marginal cost tolls in the original setup does not improveand instead significantly deteriorates -the resulting efficiency.
Results
We begin by introducing the formal notion of price-of-anarchy, before presenting the main result. Towards this goal, we consider congestion games where all latencies belong to a common set of functions L, which we assume is generated by a linear combination of given bases bj : N → R ≥0 , j = 1, . . . , m, with nonnegative coefficients. This framework is extremely rich, and accommodates well-studied classes of problems, e.g., polynomial congestion games (33) . Affine congestion games are obtained, for example, setting b1(x) = 1, b2(x) = x. We denote with G the set of all congestion games that can be constructed with latencies as in the above, and a maximum of n players. Our objective is that of associating each latency to a corresponding toll, which we denote with τ = T ( ). Observe that τ : {1, . . . , n} → R ≥0 is congestion-dependent (i.e., it associates a real number to every integer in {1, ..., n}). The inefficiency of a tolling mechanism T is commonly measured by the price-of-anarchy (37) , defined as
where MinCost(G) and NashCost(G, T ) are the minimum social cost, and the highest social cost at a Nash equilibrium when employing the mechanism T on the game G. By definition PoA(T ) ≥ 1, and a lower value of the price-of-anarchy corresponds to more efficient tolling. Within this context, the central planner is interested in designing a mechanism T that minimizes the price-of-anarchy. Unexpectedly, this problem can be solved through a tractable linear program.
Optimal Local Tolls. Let (x) = m j=1 αjbj(x) be a latency function. A local taxation mechanism minimizing the price-ofanarchy defined in Eq. (2) is given by
where we define bj(0) = fj(0) = fj(n + 1) = 0 to ease the notation. The resulting optimal price-of-anarchy is maxj{1/ρ opt j }, where ρ opt j is the value of the linear program in Eq. (3).
The above statement contains two fundamental results. The first part of the statement shows that an optimal taxation mechanism is a linear map. As a consequence, the toll applied to any latency function (x) = m j=1 αjbj(x) can be obtained as the linear combination of τ opt j (x), with the same coefficients αj used to define (x). Complementary to this, the second part of the statement provides a practical technique to compute τ opt j (x) for each of the basis bj(x), as the solution of a simple linear program. This is particularly valuable, as linear programs can be solved extremely efficiently through widely available software packages, e.g., (38, 39) . Furthermore, the approach presented allows to precompute and store in a library the values of τ opt j (x) for different basis functions (e.g., polynomials). Having done so, the only operations required to compute an optimal toll T opt ( ) are mere addition and multiplications of τ opt j (x) -stored in the library -with αj. A graphical representation of this process is included in Fig. 4 .
Review of Tolling in Congestion
Games. The scientific interest in the design of tolls can be traced back to (20) . Since then, a large body of literature in the areas of transportation and computer science has investigated this approach (21) (22) (23) (24) .
In this respect, the continuous-flow approximation of Rosenthal's original model is by far the most well understood, as uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is guaranteed, greatly simplifying the analysis. In this setting, Pigouvian tolls produce an emergent behavior which is always optimal (20, 28) .
With regard to the original congestion game model, much less is known as observed, e.g., by (29) , in part due to the multiplicity of equilibria. Within this setting, no tolling scheme can incentivize optimal routing in every instance (27) . Despite the vast scientific interest in the design of tolling schemes, there is currently no means to derive a set of optimal local tolls, let alone being able to do so through a computationally tractable approach. It is in fact already di cult to provide tight e ciency bounds for a given tolling scheme, as one must consider its performance over multiple instances. To date, the only available answer is confined to problems where all latencieş e are a ne functions, and under the restrictive requirement that each tolling function ·e is congestion-independent (25) .
Tolling schemes utilizing full information have recently been proposed for congestion games where all latencies¸e are polynomial functions of the utilization (26) . Unfortunately, the above-mentioned work requires leveraging complete network and user information -a rather impractical scenario. In addition, the resulting taxation mechanism must be recomputed for any change in the network topology, lacking the robustness property one hopes for (see Fig. 2 ). Finally, the computation of these tolls has complexity growing exponentially with the central planner is interested in designing a mechanism T that results in the highest possible e ciency, i.e., that minimizes Eq. (2). The following theorem resolves this question.
Optimal Local Tolls. Let¸=
q m j=1 -jbj be a latency function. A local taxation mechanism minimizing the price-ofanarchy defined in Eq. (2) is given by
and f opt j is the solution to the following linear program,
The optimal price of anarchy is 1/fl ı .
The above statement contains two fundamental results. Paccagnan et al.
We finally observe that a different linear program can be derived in order to compute (and not optimize) the efficiency of given tolls (see the supplementary material). As the un-tolled case corresponds to setting the tolls to be identically zero, our linear programming approach recovers many well-known results on the efficiency of un-tolled systems, e.g., (19, (32) (33) (34) (35) , reported in the second column of Table 1 . In addition to that, it allows to automatically discover novel efficiency bounds: for any given choice of basis functions, the associated linear program returns the exact value of the price-of-anarchy, avoiding the need for ad hoc constructions as those appearing in the above-cited works.
Local tolling vs Global tolling.
Leveraging the framework presented above, we have computed optimal local tolls for a variety of basis functions, including the widely-studied polynomial case. The resulting values of the price-of-anarchy are presented in the fourth column of Table 1 , while the corresponding tolls are depicted in Fig. 5 . We compare these results with those derived in (28, 29) , which instead make use of global information (for example, by letting the tolling function on edge e depend on the latency functions on all the other edges).
Surprisingly, the efficiency of optimal tolls designed using only local information is almost identical to that of optimal tolls designed using global information (compare the fourth and third columns in Table 1 ). In addition to providing similar performances by means of less information, local tolls offer two fundamental advantages. First, local tolls are robust against uncertain scenarios, e.g., modification of the origin/destination pairs, modification in the network topology, etc. Second, local tolls can be computed very efficiently, as discussed in the previous section. These observations are extremely valuable to the central planner and to the practitioners, in that they suggest -through principled analysis -to focus on the design of mechanisms that utilize only local information. second column features the price-of-anarchy in the un-tolled case, recovering the results of (32-35). The third column describes the values of the price-of-anarchy for optimal tolls utilizing global information (28, 29). The fourth column contains the prices-of-anarchy obtained utilizing optimal local tolls, designed as described earlier. The fifth column contains the prices-of-anarchy resulting from constant (i.e., congestion-independent) optimal tolls. These two columns are composed of entirely novel results, except for the case of constant tolls and d = 1, which appeared in (28) . While such results have been obtained with n = 100, identical efficiency values are found for larger n, see the supplementary material. Note that i) optimal tolls relying only on local information perform very closely to optimal tolls designed using global information, with a difference in performance below 1% for d = 1, see last column; ii) congestion-independent tolls result in a price-of-anarchy that is comparable to that obtained using congestion-dependent local tolls only for polynomials of low degree. 
Congestion-independent vs congestion-aware local tolls.
In this section we compare the performance of congestionindependent optimal local tolls (i.e., tolls that are constant for any value of the congestion), with that of congestionaware optimal local tolls, designed as per the above-procedure. Congestion-independent local tolls are attractive from the standpoint of the central planner because of their simplicity. Indeed, congestion-independent tolls do not require any physical infrastructure devoted to measuring the congestion in real-time, and to broadcasting the corresponding tolls. In this respect, many of the existing congestion-pricing schemes are of this form (e.g., London Congestion Charge (40), or the proposed Congestion Princing Plan for New York (41)).
Congestion-independent optimal local tolls can be computed through a simple modification of the linear program presented in Eq. (3), further showcasing the breadth of this approach. In further details, Eq. (3) needs to be modified so as to include the constraints imposing τ opt j to be congestionindependent, i.e., τ opt j (1) = · · · = τ opt j (n), see supplementary material. The values of the price-of-anarchy associated to congestion-independent optimal local tolls are presented in the fifth column of Table 1 . Observe that the corresponding performance is comparable with that of congestion-aware tolls for polynomial latency functions of low degree (d ≤ 3). This suggests that, whenever the travel time can be modeled as a low order polynomial, congestion-independent tolls are not only robust and simple to implement, but also efficient.
Marginal cost tolls are worse than no tolls. In the continuousflow approximation model studied in, e.g., (42) (43) (44) , users are thought of as a continuous mass flowing on a road network. Within this setup, any Nash equilibrium resulting from the application of marginal contribution tolls (known also as Pigouvian tolls) is optimal, i.e., it has a price-of-anarchy equal to one. This is a consequence of two features: i) utilizing marginal cost tolls ensures that the optimal routing is a Nash equilibrium; ii) the Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to be unique.
We have utilized the newly developed approach presented earlier to compute the efficiency of marginal cost tolls T p ( ) = τ p in the original setup of (16), where they take the form
with the convention that (0) = 0. The resulting values of the price-of-anarchy are presented in the third column of Table 2 .
Surprisingly, utilizing marginal cost tolls on the original atomic model yields a system performance that is lower than that experienced levying no toll at all (compare the columns in Table 2 ). In other words, the design principle derived from the continuous-flow model does not carry over to the original setup. The ultimate reason for this lies in the non-uniqueness of the equilibria: while aligning the users interests to the "greater good" guarantees that the best-performing equilibrium is optimal, see (21), the efficiency of the worst-performing equilibrium deteriorates. The linear programming formulation introduced earlier accounts for this, producing tolling mechanisms with the best-achievable worst-case performance.
Discussion and Conclusions
In this article, we studied the problem of designing behaviourinfluencing mechanisms for sociotechnical systems (see Fig. 1 ), where the infrastructure is represented by a road-traffic network, the users behaviour is captured by the notion of Nash equilibrium, and the mechanisms consists in the use of congestion-pricing tolls. Surprisingly, designing tolls that maximize the system-level efficiency is equivalent to solving a simple linear program, thus significantly improving upon the existing work in the literature. As a consequence, we have shown that mechanisms designed utilizing only local information are i) robust to modifications in the problem instance (origin/destination demand, network topology, etc); ii) simple to compute; and iii) perform closely to mechanisms designed utilizing global information, which lack properties i) and ii). Though our results are encouraging, they prompt as many questions as they answer. First, throughout this paper, we focused on the design of congestion-pricing schemes that are efficient in face of the worst case realization both with regards to the network topology, and the traffic demand. This design paradigm is motivated by the need for mechanisms that are robust against modification in the problem instance. As the network topology is often partially known, and past realization of the traffic demand are available, the following question naturally arises: "Can we incorporate this information to reduce the set of allowable instances and thus provide improved performance while retaining the required robustness properties?" We believe that the linear programming formulation developed here coupled with recent results in robust optimization can be further developed to probe this question.
While we considered incentives that vary depending on the traffic congestion, it is important to understand whether such mechanisms can be easily implemented utilizing the current infrastructure. As technology in vehicles and mobile de- 6 . This example demonstrates that marginal cost tolls (Pigouvian tolls) induce equilibria whose performance is worse than that encountered levying no toll at all. Each link has a latency equal to the number of users on that link, while the red/blue arrows denote a Nash equilibrium. (A) and (B) feature two users willing to travel from O1/O2 to D. In the untolled case (A) the system cost at the worst Nash-equilibrium (coinciding with the optimum for this instance) is 2.
In this setting, Table 1 guarantees that the price of anarchy is always lower than 2.5. The situation worsens when using marginal cost tolls (B), as the worst Nash equilibrium gives a system cost of 6, thus corresponding to a price of anarchy of 3. Introducing marginal cost tolls has worsened the price-of-anarchy from 2.5 to 3.
vices further integrates into society's means of transportation, the ability to reach users with incentives improves, and the prospect of adjusting prices in real-time becomes increasingly realistic (45) . Certainly, less sophisticated tolling schemes can be considered, such as fixed-price tolls (also featured in this work) or pricing only certain roads or lanes. We remark that in all these scenarios one should expect a complex and nuanced compromise between the simplicity of the mechanism, its robustness, and the loss in performance. While this work gives insight into such a trade-off by analyzing both fixed and non-fixed tolls, characterizing this trade-off more broadly remains an open question.
Finally, our analysis is based on the assumption that users act rationally, purely interested in minimizing their own travel time. This assumption has found partial empirical evidence on a macroscopic scale (46) and it's further justified by the increase in the utilization of routing maps that provide the users with "selfish" routing options (47) . Nevertheless, the rationality assumption should be thought of as a first order approximation that does not fully capture the users response. In this regards, the results contained here need to be extended to more realistic and detailed behavioural models.
Supplementary material
The supplementary material is organized as follows.
-In Section 1, we prove the main result, i.e., the fact that optimal local tolls can be derived as the solution to the linear program in Eq. (3).
-In Section 2, we show how to construct optimal local tolls that achieve the efficiency values presented in Table 1 (fourth column) for any arbitrary n.
-In Section 3 we demonstrate how to derive optimal constant local tolls and the corresponding prices-of-anarchy.
-In Section 4 we derive the values of the price-of-anarchy of marginal cost tolls (Pigouvian tolls).
Proof of the main result
In this section we prove the main result appearing in Eq. (3). We divide this proof into two parts, for clarity and ease of exposition.
Part 1.
In this part we show that there exist optimal tolls that are linear. Towards this goal, consider an optimal linear tolling mechanism T opt , and assume, by contradiction, that there exists a tolling mechanismT such that
For this proof, we define the class of games G({0, 1}) ⊂ G, in which any given edge e has α e k = 1 for at most one k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, and α e j = 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, j = k. Observe that all tolling mechanisms are linear in G({0, 1}), as each edge can now utilize only latencies ∈ {b 1 , . . . , bm}. Thus,
where G(N) ⊂ G is the subclass of games with α j ∈ N for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, for all edges in E. Eq. (4) holds because G({0, 1}) ⊂ G, Eq. (5) holds because any game in G(N) is equivalent to a game in G({0, 1}) with ∈ {b 1 , . . . , bm}, and Eq. (6) holds by Lemma 2.
Since T opt is an optimal linear tolling mechanism,
which, combined with Eqs. (4) to (6) , contradicts the assumption. Thus, there exists an optimal tolling mechanism T opt that is linear.
Part 2.
We utilize the linear program derived in (48) to optimize over all possible linear tolls. Putting this together with the claim in Part 1 will conclude the proof. The authors of (48) show that the following linear program computes a set of optimal linear tolls
, and each of the functions f j solves
where we set f (0) = f (n + 1) = b(0) = 0 to simplify notation. The corresponding optimal price-of-anarchy of the class of costminimization games is max{1/ρ opt 1 , . . . , 1/ρ opt m }. Finally, positivity of the tolls is ensured by introducing the additional constraint f j (x) ≥ b j (x) for all 1 ≤ x ≤ n. Lemma 1. Consider the class of congestion games G. For any linear tolling mechanism T , it holds that
where G(Q) ⊂ G is the subclass of games with α j ∈ Q for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, for all edges in E.
Proof. Note that the price-of-anarchy is defined as a supremum, and that PoA Q (T ) ≤ PoA(T ), in general. According to (49, Thm. 1), we know that the price-of-anarchy of a given class of costminimization games is the solution of a linear program and that the game G exists. Note that the decision variables entering in (49, Thm. 1) are represented by θ(x, y, z) ∈ R ≥0 , where x, y, z ∈ N and 1 ≤ x + y + z ≤ n, and that a given set of tuples θ(x, y, z) encodes the action sets of the agents as well as the coefficients of the latency functions corresponding to any game G. Let θ (x, y, z) represent a tuple solving the linear program in (49, Thm. 1). If all the values θ (x, y, z) are rational, then we are done, as the corresponding game G ∈ G(Q). Otherwise, we can show that there exists a sequence of rational-valued games G k such that the supremum over their prices-of-anarchy is equal to PoA(T ). This follows because the feasible set is a nonempty compact polytope, so that there exists a series of games G k with θ k (x, y, z) ∈ Q converging to θ (x, y, z) that satisfies the constraints of the linear program, and whose corresponding worst-case efficiency converges to PoA(T ) from below.
Lemma 2.
Consider the class of congestion games G. For any tolling mechanism T , the following equality holds,
where G(N) ⊂ G is the subclass of games with α j ∈ N for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, for all edges in E.
Proof.
Observe that the left-most equality holds by Lemma 1. For a given game G ∈ G(Q), we denote by d G the lowest common denominator among the latency function coefficients α j , across all the edges of the game. Defineα j = α j ·d G ∈ N for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, for all edges in E. Since the equilibrium conditions are independent to uniform scaling of the latency functions and tolls, any game G ∈ G(Q) with latency coefficients {α j } m j=1 has the same worst-case equilibrium efficiency as a gameĜ which is identical to G except that it has latency coefficients {α j } m j=1 . Observing thatĜ belongs to both G(Q) and G(N) concludes the proof.
Characterizing the price-of-anarchy. The authors of (48) show how to compute the price-of-anarchy for given linear tolls as the solution of a linear program. In this section we recall that result, which we will exploit throughout the remainder of the manuscript.
Consider the class of congestion games where the latency functions are generated by the linear combination of the basis b 1 (x), . . . , bm(x) with non-negative coefficients {α j } m j=1 . Given a linear taxation mechanism T ( ) = In the special case where all the functions {f j } m j=1 are nondecreasing in x, i.e., f j (x + 1) ≥ f j (x) for all 1 ≤ x ≤ n − 1 and all j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, it is sufficient to only consider the constraints with x = max{0, y + z − n}, as demonstrated in (49, Cor. 1). Then, the linear program simplifies to
where u, v ∈ {0, . . . , n}.
Optimal local tolls for arbitrary number of agents
While the linear programming formulation introduced in Eq. (3) provides an optimal tolling mechanisms and a corresponding priceof-anarchy when the number of agents is upper-bounded by n, in this section we show how to design tolling mechanisms that provide price-of-anarchy values identical to those in Table 1 and apply to any n (possibly infinite). For clarity and conciseness of exposition, we consider the case of d = 1 as a similar approach can be applied to any d. For d = 1 Table 1 shows that the optimal price-of-anarchy is 2.012 (up to three decimal digits), obtained with a choice of n = 100. Here we intend to derive a mechanism that will give the same performance for any arbitrarily large n. When d = 1 (affine congestion games) any latency function of the form (x) = α 1 + α 2 x (with non-negative α 1 , α 2 ) is allowed, thus corresponding to bases b 1 (x) = 1 and b 2 (x) = x. A linear tolling mechanisms is obtained as T
We are therefore left to define f 1 (x), f 2 (x) for any x ∈ N (Part 1) and to quantify the resulting performance (Part 2). We begin with an overview of these two parts, followed by a detailed proof.
-Part 1. We define f 1 (x) = 1 for any x ∈ N. The definition of f 2 is instead more involved, and is described in the following. We utilize a modified version of the linear program of Eq. (3) where we consider only the basis b 2 (x) = x, and compute a solution f opt for a given n =n. We then construct f 2 (x) for any x ∈ N, matching f opt for x ≤n/2, while we provide an analytical expression for f 2 (x) when x ≥n/2. -Part 2. We show that for some choice ofn finite (in fact we will chosen = 100) the price-of-anarchy associated to the pair f 1 , f 2 matches 2.012 up to three decimal digits, regardless of how large n is.
Part 1.
As anticipated, we let f 1 (x) = 1 for all x ∈ N, while the definition of f 2 (x) is described in the following. Towards this goal, for any given choice ofn even, we solve the following linear program corresponding to the basis b 2 
with the usual convention that f (0) = f (n + 1) = 0. Note that the previous program is identical to that in Eq. (3) except that i) we are no longer requiring positivity of the tolls (we will fix this at then end); and ii) we have included two additional sets of constraints, i.e. f (x) ≤ x for x ∈ {1, . . . , n} and f (x + 1) ≥ f (x) for x ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. We let (f opt , ρ opt ) be a solution of this program and utilize it to define f 2 : N → R as follows
Note that f 2 is defined for any integer x ∈ N, while β ≥ 0 † was chosen so that the two expressions defining f 2 match for x = † Observe that f 2 (1) ≥ 0 since having f 2 (1) < 0 would always result in a lower performance, as shown in (50) . Therefore f 2 (n/2) ≥ 0 as it is feasible for Eq. (8), which includes the constraint f (x + 1) ≥ f (x). Hence, β ≥ 0.
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n/2. While the expression of f 2 and all forthcoming quantities depends on the choice ofn, we do not make this explicit to ease the notation. Whenn = 10, one has, for example, ρ opt = 0.4971, β = 0.6364, where the firstn/2 components of f opt are f opt = [1, 1.5029, 2.0176, 2.5793, 3.1822], thus fully defining f 2 .
Part 2.
We intend to show that the pair f 1 , f 2 results in a priceof-anarchy of 2.012 whenn is chosen to be sufficiently large (but finite), regardless of the value of n. Towards this goal, we observe that f 1 is non-decreasing by definition, while f 2 is non-decreasing because it is a solution of Eq. (8) for x ≤n/2 and because of its definition in Eq. (9) for x >n/2. Since both f 1 and f 2 are nondecreasing, we utilize the linear program in Eq. (7) , to characterize the performance of f 1 , f 2 , which reads as
where the indices u, v belong to {0, . . . , n}. Characterizing the performance of the given mechanism amounts to finding the largest possible ρ that is feasible for the latter program. The challenging task is that we intend to do so for n arbitrary large. It is immediate to observe, that the constraints involving f 1 reduce to v −ρu+ν(u−v) = v(1−ν)+u(ν −ρ) ≥ 0, both in the case of u + v ≤ n and u + v > n. These inequalities are satisfied for any choice of ρ ≤ 1, and for any n, once we set ν = 1. As it will appear clear later, these constraints will not play any role in defining the resulting price-of-anarchy, which will be purely determined by f 2 .
We now turn our attention to the constraints involving f 2 , and divide the discussion in two parts, as the expressions are different for u + v ≤ n and u + v > n. Before doing so, we study the degenerate case of u = 0, for which the constraints in Eq. (10) reduce to f 2 (1) ≤ 1, which holds as f 2 is feasible for the linear program in Eq. (8) (which already includes this constraint).
-Case of u + v ≤ n, u ≥ 1. The constraints reduce to
which we want to hold for any integers u ≥ 1, v ≥ 0 (the bound on the indices u + v ≤ n can be dropped as we are interested in the case of arbitrary large n). • In the region where 0 ≤ v ≤ u, 1 ≤ u ≤n/2 (region A in Fig. 7 , left) these constraints certainly hold with ρ = ρ opt , ν = 1. This follows because f 2 (u) = f opt (u) when u ≤n/2, and f opt is feasible for the program in Eq. (8) which includes the constraints in Eq. (11) .
• In the region where v ≥ u, 1 ≤ u ≤n/2 (region B in Fig. 7 , left) these constraints also hold with ρ = ρ opt , ν = 1 thanks to Lemma 3, part a).
• We are left with the region where u >n/2, v ≥ 0 (region C in Fig. 7, left) . In this case, f 2 (u) = β · u by definition.
With the choice of ν = 1, the constraints in Eq. (11) read
One observes (see Fig. 7 , right) that v 2 − ρu 2 + βu 2 − βv(u + 1) = 0 represents an ellipse in the plane (u, v) (when allowing u, v to be real numbers). Additionally, one notes that the ellipse lies entirely on the left of the vertical line u = u 1 , where u 1 is given by
One further observes that the pairs (u, v) for which Eq. (12) holds are all those lying "outside" of the region enclosed by the ellipse (shaded region in Fig. 7,  right) . Therefore, in order for Eq. (11) to be satisfied for any u ≥n/2, it suffices to select ρ so that u 1 ≤n/2 in Eq. (13) . This results in the following constraint on ρ
which we want to hold for any u + v > n, and any n ≥n. • In the region where u ≤n/2 and u + v > n (region A in Fig. 8, left) , these constraints hold with ρ = ρ opt , ν = 1 thanks to Lemma 3 part b), for any n ≥n.
• We are left with the region where u >n/2, u + v > n (region B in Fig. 8, left) . In this case, f 2 (u) = β · u, and therefore the constraints in Eq. (14) read as
where we have already chosen ν = 1. We intend to show that Eq. (15) is satisfied for any u + v > n, for any n ≥n. One observes (see Fig. 8 , right) that v 2 −ρu 2 +(n−v)βu− (n − u)β(u + 1) = 0 represents an ellipse in the plane (j, v) (when allowing for u, v to be real numbers), and that the pairs (u, v) that satisfy Eq. (15) are all those that lie "outside" of the region enclosed by the ellipse (shaded region in Fig. 8, right) . One verifies that the ellipse always lies on the left of the straight line u + v = n, if ρ is chosen such that ρ ≤ 1 + 2β + (β − n(β + 2)) 2 /4n(β − n). ‡ In this case all the pairs (u, v) with u + v > n will satisfy the desired constraints in Eq. (15) . One further observes that the expression 1+2β +(β − n(β + 2)) 2 /4n(β − n) is ‡ When this holds with equality, the ellipse touches the straight line u + v = n. 8 Paccagnan et al.
increasing in n ≥n. It follows that the tightest constraint on ρ is achieved when n =n, resulting in ρ ≤ ρ 2 = 1 + 2β + (β −n(β + 2)) 2 4n(β −n) Withn = 10, this reduces to ρ ≤ 0.5056.
In conclusion, we have shown that f 1 , f 2 , ρ = min{ρ opt , ρ 1 , ρ 2 }, ν = 1, is a feasible solution for the linear program in Eq. (10) . Consequently, the resulting price-of-anarchy is upper bounded by 1/ min{ρ opt , ρ 1 , ρ 2 }. For the case ofn = 10, one obtains 1/ min{ρ opt , ρ 1 , ρ 2 } = 1/ρ 1 ≤ 1/0.49 = 2.0408. One can repeat this reasoning for any choice ofn even. Selecting, for examplen = 100, produces a mechanism with price-of-anarchy matching 2.012 (up to three significant digits). To conclude, we observe that the mechanisms
might not satisfy the constraints τ 2 (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ N (i.e., they might be monetary incentives and not tolls). Nevertheless, multiplying both f 1 and f 2 with a common scaling factor γ > 0 also results in the same value of the price-of-anarchy (the same reasoning will go through with ν = 1/γ in place of ν = 1). Therefore, one simply needs to consider tolls of the form
where γ is chosen sufficiently large so as to satisfy
Proof. First claim: for v = u the constraint of interest reduces to 1) ), while for v = u + p (with p ≥ 1) the constraint reads as
Proving the claim amounts to showing
for p ≥ 1. After some manipulations, this reduces to f (u + 1) ≤ p + 2u, the tightest of which is derived for p = 1, resulting in f (u + 1) ≤ 1 + 2u, which is equivalent to f (u) ≤ 1 + 2(u − 1). Since we assumed f (u) ≤ u, it suffices to verify that u ≤ 1 + 2(u − 1), which indeed holds for any u ≥ 1.
Second claim: no proof is needed when n =n. Hence, we focus on the case of 1 ≤n < n and assume that
holds for any given pair (u, v) with u ≤n/2, v ≤n, u + v > n. For each given pair (u, v) as in the above, we show that Eq. (16) implies the constraint obtained replacing in the aboven with n and considering the pair (u, v + n −n), i.e.,
In this a way, we cover one by one all the inequalities that we need to prove. Proving the results now amounts to showing that
which is equivalent to f (u + 1) ≤ (n −n) + 2v. The most binding requirement amounts to choosing n−n = 1, and v =n−u, resulting in f (u + 1) ≤ 1 + 2(n − u). Since by assumption f (u) ≤ u, it suffices to show that u + 1 ≤ 1 + 2(n − u). It is immediate to verify that this inequality holds for any u ≤ 2n/3, which is sufficient as we only need the claim to hold for u ≤n/2.
Congestion-Independent Tolls
As mentioned in the main body of this manuscript, congestionindependent tolls (often referred to as fixed tolls) can be computed using a modification of the linear program in Eq. (3) where additional constraints are introduced. A fixed toll requires that for each basis latency function b j , the tolling function τ j = T (b j ) is constant with the amount of traffic, i.e., τ (1) = τ (2) = . . . = τ (n) = τ .
Computing the price-of-anarchy of a given fixed toll amounts to utilizing the program in Eq. (7), where we set f j (x) = b j (x) + τ j (x). Nevertheless, one can utilize the same program also to compute optimal fixed tolls. Indeed, one can allow τ j to become a decision variable in Eq. (7) . A direct application of this approach results in a bilinear program, as the constraints contain the product of the decision variables τ j and ν. Nevertheless, this can be easily circumvented by defining the decision variable σ j = ντ j , where the resulting linear program reads as
If (ρ opt , ν opt , σ opt ) is the solution to Eq. (17), then the resulting price-of-anarchy is 1/ρ opt , and the optimal fixed toll for resources with latency b j is
The price-of-anarchy bounds from the solutions of Eq. (17) for polynomials of order at most d = 1, 2, . . . , 6 are shown in Table 1 .
To illustrate that these are indeed the true price-of-anarchy values, and that these numbers hold for any arbitrarily large n, we will independently prove the bound for congestion games where each edge is associated to a quadratic latency function, i.e., a latency function of the form (x) = αx 2 , α ≥ 0 (the case of d = 1 has been shown in (28) resulting in an optimal price-of-anarchy of 1 + 2/ √ 3 ≈ 2.155). In this case, we will also provide an analytic expression for the optimal fixed toll. A similar argument can be applied to the case when d ≥ 2.
Theorem 1. Consider any congestion game where the latency function on each edge is of the form (x) = αx 2 for some α ≥ 0. An optimal constant toll minimizing the price-of-anarchy is T opt ( ) = ατ opt = 3α, resulting in a price-of-anarchy of 16/3 ≈ 5.33.
Proof. We prove the claim in two steps. First, we show that the price-of-anarchy for any fixed toll is larger than 16/3. Second, we show that the price-of-anarchy obtained with τ opt = 3 is lowerbounded by 16/3. Towards this goal, observe that any constant tolling mechanisms applied to a quadratic latency (x) = αx 2 takes the form T ( ) = ατ , for some τ ≥ 0. For any τ ≥ 3 we consider the following problem instance: there are 8 agents each with two actions a ne i and a opt i . In action a ne i , user i selects 6 of the available 8 edges, which are associated to a latency γx 2 /8; in a opt i user i selects the remaining two edges with latency γx 2 /8, as well as one edge with latency βx 2 /8. Each player has a similar pair of actions, but each subsequent agent is offset by one from the prior user, as depicted in Fig. 9 .
In this game, the system and user costs read as follows SC(a ne ) = 6(γb(6)) = 216γ [17] SC(a opt ) = 2γb(2) + βb(1) = 8γ + β C i (a ne ) = 6γ(b(6) + τ ) = 216γ + 6γτ C i (a opt i , a ne −i ) = 2γ(49 + τ ) + β(1 + τ ). We normalize the costs in the game setting SC(a ne ) = 1, which results in γ = 1/216 from Eq. (17) . To ensure that the joint action a ne is a Nash equilibrium (at least weakly), we impose that C i (a ne ) = C i (a opt i , a ne −i ) for any player i. This condition is satisfied when β = 2τ + 59 108(1 + τ ) [18] Paccagnan et al. Hence, the price-of-anarchy in this game is lower-bounded by SC(a ne )/SC(a opt ) = 1/SC(a opt ) = 1/(8" + -). This expression is larger-equal to 16/3 for any choice of · Ø 3, where we have utilized the values offrom Eq. (18) and " = 1/216.
For · < 3 we construct a new game with similar features. There are 3 users each with two actions a ne i and a opt i . In action a ne i , user i selects 2 out of the 3 available edges featuring a latency "x 2 /3; in a opt i they select the remaining edge with latency "x 2 /3, as well as one edge with latency -x 3 /3. Each player has a similar pair of actions, but each subsequent agent is o set by one from the prior user (see Fig. 10 ). In this game, we obtain the following system and user costs: SC(a ne ) = 2("b(2)) = 8" SC(a opt ) = "b(1) + -b(1) = " + -C i (a ne ) = 2"(b(2) + · ) = 8" + 2"· C i (a opt i , a ne ≠i ) = "(9 + · ) + -(1 + · ). As in the previous example, we set SC(a ne ) = 1 implying " = 1/8. To ensure that the joint action a ne is a Nash equilibrium (at least weakly), we impose that C i (a ne ) = C i (a opt i , a ne ≠i ) for any player i, resulting in
The resulting price-of-anarchy is lower-bounded by 1/SC(a opt ) = 1/(" + -). This quantity is larger-equal than 16/3 for any choice of · < 3.
Finally, for the fixed toll · = 3, we upper-bound the price-ofanarchy at 16/3. Let a ne be an equilibrium in a congestion game G, with n users, edges in e oe E, where all latencies take the form (x) = "x 2 , for some " Ø 0. Then the cost at equilibrium satisfies = 4SC(a opt ) + 1 4 SC(a ne ), [23] where y e = |a ne | e ≠ x e , z e = |a opt | e ≠ x e , and x e = |{i oe N s.t. e oe a ne i fl a opt i }|. Observe that Eq. (19) holds from the definition of Nash equilibrium, while Eq. (20) follows from the parameterization introduced in (50) (also recalled above), and substituting b e (x) = x 2 . Eq. (21) follows by replacing · = 3 and by x e Ø 0. To see that Eq. (22) holds for all integers x e , y e Ø 0, we define u = x e + y e Ø 0, v = x e + z e Ø 0, and divide the argument in two parts depending on whether the integer tuple (u, v) oe {u Ø 22 or v Ø 7} or not. For the case of (u, v) oe {u Ø 22 or v Ø 7}, we observe that
and therefore we intend to show that
Di erentiating with respect to v shows that v = (u + 2)/ Ô 12 are the only minima in v that occur in the positive orthant and the left hand side of Eq. (24) 
Price-of-anarchy of marginal cost tolls
In this section we derive the exact value of the price-of-anarchy when Pigouvian tolls are utilized. We do so for the case of d = 1 as similar arguments carry over for the case of d Ø 1.
We begin by observing that Fig. 6 is an example of an a ne congestion game under discretized Pigouvian tolls with n = 2, and that it has a price-of-anarchy of 3. Thus, it must be that PoA(T p ) Ø 3 for congestion games with a ne latency functions. We now show that PoA(T p ) AE 3 for the linear latency basis, b(x) = x, via a smoothness argument. We note that · p (x) = x ≠ 1 for the linear latency basis. For a ne oe A satisfying the Nash equilibrium 10 Paccagnan et al. Hence, the price-of-anarchy in this game is lower-bounded by SC(a ne )/SC(a opt ) = 1/SC(a opt ) = 1/(8γ + β). This expression is larger-equal to 16/3 for any choice of τ ≥ 3, where we have utilized the values of β from Eq. (18) and γ = 1/216.
For τ < 3 we construct a new game with similar features. There are 3 users each with two actions a ne i and a opt i . In action a ne i , user i selects 2 out of the 3 available edges featuring a latency γx 2 /3; in a opt i they select the remaining edge with latency γx 2 /3, as well as one edge with latency βx 3 /3. Each player has a similar pair of actions, but each subsequent agent is offset by one from the prior user (see Fig. 10 ). Hence, the price-of-anarchy in this game is lower-bounded by SC(a ne )/SC(a opt ) = 1/SC(a opt ) = 1/(8" + -). This expression is larger-equal to 16/3 for any choice of · Ø 3, where we have utilized the values offrom Eq. (18) and " = 1/216.
Finally, for the fixed toll · = 3, we upper-bound the price-ofanarchy at 16/3. Let a ne be an equilibrium in a congestion game G, with n users, edges in e oe E, where all latencies take the form (x) = "x 2 , for some " Ø 0. Then the cost at equilibrium satisfies (22) holds for all integers x e , y e Ø 0, we define u = x e + y e Ø 0, v = x e + z e Ø 0, and divide the argument in two parts depending on whether the integer tuple (u, v) oe {u Ø 22 or v Ø 7} or not. For the case of (u, v) oe {u Ø 22 or v Ø 7}, we observe that
We begin by observing that Fig. 6 is an example of an a ne congestion game under discretized Pigouvian tolls with n = 2, and that it has a price-of-anarchy of 3. Thus, it must be that PoA(T p ) Ø 3 for congestion games with a ne latency functions. We now show that PoA(T p ) AE 3 for the linear latency basis, b(x) = x, via a smoothness argument. We note that · p (x) = x ≠ 1 for the linear latency basis. For a ne oe A satisfying the Nash equilibrium 10 Paccagnan et al. In this game, we obtain the following system and user costs: SC(a ne ) = 2(γb(2)) = 8γ SC(a opt ) = γb(1) + βb(1) = γ + β C i (a ne ) = 2γ(b(2) + τ ) = 8γ + 2γτ C i (a opt i , a ne −i ) = γ(9 + τ ) + β(1 + τ ). As in the previous example, we set SC(a ne ) = 1 implying γ = 1/8. To ensure that the joint action a ne is a Nash equilibrium (at least weakly), we impose that C i (a ne ) = C i (a opt i , a ne −i ) for any player i, resulting in β = τ − 1 8 (1 + τ ) .
The resulting price-of-anarchy is lower-bounded by 1/SC(a opt ) = 1/(γ + β). This quantity is larger-equal than 16/3 for any choice of τ < 3.
Finally, for the fixed toll τ = 3, we upper-bound the price-ofanarchy at 16/3. Let a ne be an equilibrium in a congestion game G, with n users, edges in e ∈ E, where all latencies take the form (x) = γx 2 , for some γ ≥ 0. Then the cost at equilibrium satisfies SC(a ne ) ≤ 
= 4SC(a opt ) + 1 4 SC(a ne ), [23] where ye = |a ne |e − xe, ze = |a opt |e − xe, and xe = |{i ∈ N s.t. e ∈ a ne i ∩ a opt i }|. Observe that Eq. (19) holds from the definition of Nash equilibrium, while Eq. (20) follows from the parameterization introduced in (50) (also recalled above), and substituting be(x) = x 2 . Eq. Table 1 .
In this section we derive the exact value of the price-of-anarchy when Pigouvian tolls are utilized. We do so for the case of d = 1 as similar arguments carry over for the case of d ≥ 1.
We begin by observing that Fig. 6 is an example of an affine congestion game under discretized Pigouvian tolls with n = 2, and that it has a price-of-anarchy of 3. Thus, it must be that PoA(T p ) ≥ 3 for congestion games with affine latency functions. We now show that PoA(T p ) ≤ 3 for the linear latency basis, b(x) = x, via a smoothness argument. We note that τ p (x) = x − 1 for the linear latency basis. For a ne ∈ A satisfying the Nash equilibrium 10 Paccagnan et al.
constraints, and a opt ∈ A, the optimal allocation, we get that [27] where again we utilize the notation ye = |a ne |e − xe, ze = |a opt |e − xe, and xe = |{i ∈ N s.t. e ∈ a ne i ∩ a opt i }|. Eq. (25) holds by the definition of the Nash equilibrium, and Eq. (26) holds due to nonnegativity of xe and αe. One can verify that Eq. (27) holds, using u = xe + ye ≥ 0, v = xe + ze ≥ 0, and observing that the region 3v 2 + u 2 − u − 2uv − v ≥ 0 is the exterior of an ellipse, and contains all (u, v) ∈ N 2 . Rearranging the above inequality, we get PoA(T p ) ≤ SC(a ne )/SC(a opt ) ≤ 3.
